I analyze the risk preferences of bettors using data from the world's largest betting exchange, Betfair. The assumption of a constant bet size, commonly used in the current literature, leads to an unrealistic model of bettors' decision making as a choice between a high return -low variance and low returnhigh variance bet, automatically implying risk-loving preferences of bettors. However, the data show that bettors bet dierent amounts on dierent odds. Thus, simply by introducing the computed average bet size at given odds I transform the bettor's decision problem into a standard choice between low return -low variance and high return -high variance bets, and I am able to correctly estimate the risk attitudes of bettors. Results indicate that bettors on Betfair are either risk neutral (tennis and soccer markets) or slightly risk loving (horse racing market). I further use the information on the average bet size to test the validity of Expected utility theory (EUT). The results suggest that, when facing a number of outcomes with dierent winning probabilities, bettors tend to overweight small and underweight large dierences in probabilities, which is in direct contradiction to the linear probability weighting function implied by EUT. V £lánku se zabývám analýzou chování sázejících na nejv¥t²í online burze sázek -Betfair. Cílem této analýzy je bliº²í pochopení jednoho ze základních kamen· ekonomické teorie -rozhodování lidí v podmínkách nejistoty a jejich p°ístup k riziku. Sázení je jednou z mála situací v reálném ºivot¥, které se pro ov¥°ování r·zných teorií o chování lidí v rámci rizika a nejistoty p°ímo vybízí. V²echny dosavadní studie na toto téma v²ak opomíjely jeden podstatný fakt v rozhodování sázka°· -p°i výb¥ru sázky hraje významnou roli nejen daný kurz, ale také vý²e sázky. Vyuºitím dat z online burzy sázek nejen o výsledných kurzech na danou sázkovou p°íleºitost ale i o, z dat vypo£tených pr·m¥rn¥, vsazených £ástkách, tato studie velmi významn¥ p°ispívá k analýze chování v rámci rizika a nejisoty. Studie, za pouºití nov¥ navrºené metodologie, testuje platnost jednoho z hlavních p°edpoklad· EUT o racionálním p°ís-tupu k pravd¥podobnostem. Moje výsledky nazna£ují, ºe sázka°i dávají p°i rozhodování v rámci rizika malým rozdíl·m v pravd¥podobnostech blízko nule vy²²í váhu neº £ist¥ racionáln¥ smý²lející £lov¥k a naopak velkým rozdíl·m v pravd¥podobnostech výrazn¥ niº²í váhu neº £ist¥ racionáln¥ smý²lející £lov¥k. 
Introduction
Expected utility theory (EUT) is considered to be one of the keystones of modern economic theory, yet its validity has been challenged by a large number of studies. The most prominent critique of EUT concerns the assumption that probability enters linearly into people's preferences over lotteries . As pointed out by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , the impact of the probability on the preferences over lotteries also depends on its distance from the so-called reference pointscertainty and impossibility. This notion became the building block of behavioral theories of decision making under risk and uncertainty, and led to the introduction of non-linear probability weighting functions.
A number of experiments document that behavioral theories are able to explain decision making under risk and uncertainty remarkably better than can EUT. There are, however, few empirical studies which assess the validity either of EUT or of behavioral theories in real situations. An innovative strand of empirical literature on this topic analyzes price data (odds) from betting markets . These papers generally try to explain the existence of favorite-long shot bias ! , where bets on low probability outcomes of events have a lower expected return than bets on high probability outcomes; an observation which is not consistent with standard EUT under the classic risk-averse utility function assumption. To explain this inconsistency, two lines of argument have been used -either positing a risk-loving utility function under EUT, or introducing probability weighting functions in behavioral theories (Snowberg and Wolfers 2010) .
The main drawback of previous studies on betting markets is, however, the See for example Tversky and Kahneman (1992) -Cumulative prospect theory (CPT); and Quiggin (1982) -Rank-dependent expected utility theory (RDEU). Weitzman (1965) , Ali (1977) , Kanto, Rosenqvist, and Suvas (1992) , Hamid, Prakash, and Smyser (1996) , Golec and Tamarkin (1998) , Jullien and Salanie (2000) , Bradley (2003) , Gandhi (2008) , Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) .
! Favorite-long shot bias is one of the most prominent empirical regularities observed on betting data and was rst noted by Grith (1949) in horse racing betting markets. 3 absence of data on bet size. With the exception of Bradley (2003) , they all posit an implicit assumption that bettors place the same amount of money on outcomes with dierent odds (i.e. that the bet size is constant irrespective of the probability of the outcome). As discussed in the next section, if we allow bettors to bet dierent amounts on outcomes with dierent odds, their decision problem is transformed into a standard choice between low return -low variance and high return -high variance bets. Thus, the existence of long shot bias can be consistent with the standard risk-averse utility function under EUT, and need not resort to behavioral theories for explanation.
I design a novel empirical test to assess the validity of EUT vs. behavioral theories using information on how much bettors bet on dierent outcomes of a particular event. Further, applying data from the world's largest betting exchange, Betfair, to a wide range of events (tennis, soccer and horse races), for which outcomes span the whole range of winning probabilities, allows me to analyze decision under risk and uncertainty under various scenarios. I draw conditioned subsamples based on the occurrence of a favorite in the event (i.e. event with/without a clear favorite), " using odds as a proxy for the objective probabilities of winning. These subsamples, and particularly the ratio of bets on dierent outcomes among events, provide rich information to test whether bettors weight probabilities linearly. As the conditioned subsamples fundamentally dier in their probability ranges of outcomes, nding substantial dierences in how bettors assess the probabilities and determine the ratio of bet sizes on dierent outcomes in these conditioned subsamples strictly contradicts the linear probability weighting function assumption in EUT.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 analyzes the implications of the " Conditioning on races with high-probability winning horses was used rst by Golec and Tamarkin (1998) to address the problem of racetrack betting data, which consist of relatively few favorites (high-probability results) compared to the number of underdogs. constant bet size assumption; section 3 outlines the methodology and estimation strategy. Data description is provided in section 4, section 5 presents and discusses the results and section 6 concludes 2
Constant Bet Size Assumption
In recent years, the emergence of literature that analyzes the behavior of bettors on betting markets has fostered great progress in the understanding of decision making under risk and uncertainty. Early studies analyzing the risk preferences of bettors treat all events (races) as identical, group them by dierent characteristics, e.g. by odds intervals or position of a horse in the race (see for example Ali (1977) and Kanto, Rosenqvist, and Suvas (1992) 
In the presence of long shot bias the return on the favorite is higher than that on the underdog:
Without loss of generality we can assume that M − B = 0 and u(0) = 0. Thus, (exotic bets on the order of the rst two or three horses and on the two horses to come rst in the race in either order) and nd evidence in favor of behavioral theories. Therefore, they conclude that the long shot bias is mainly driven by the misperception of probabilities rather than by the risk-loving preferences of rational bettors.
Nevertheless, these previous studies lack important information, namely how much people bet on dierent outcomes with dierent winning probabilities. The only study to account for bet size in the analysis of bettors' behavior is Bradley (2003) . As he does not have data on bet size, he performs his analysis using the imputed optimal bet size of a representative bettor. By assuming that the only utility that a bettor has from a bet is derived from expected return and variance, he computes the optimal bet as an argument for the maximum weighted expected utility given the probabilities and odds. However, he still does not consider the main reason for including bet size, namely how it changes the estimates of the revealed risk preferences of the marginal bettor. If one allows the marginal bettor to bet amount B F on the favorite and B U on the underdog, the above stated key formula for identication of his risk preferences changes to
Let me dene the following function for the ensuing analysis 
$
In the rst step, I focus on the analysis of the fair odds case (i.e., no long shot bias present). Under EUT the risk-neutral bettor should be willing to bet any amount of money, which is unrealistic. Therefore, it is more reasonable to dene a risk-neutral bettor in terms of the bet size ratio as the limit case between a risk-loving and risk-averse bettor (see Figure 1 below). Mathematically, the risk-neutral bettor would choose, under fair odds, the ratio:
$ One would get similar results with the standard CRRA utility function u(
In the case with two outcomes, the previous expression boils down to
In the example depicted in Figure 1 , this corresponds to the B F = 90 (bet ratio 9:1). This analysis can be used to derive the risk preferences of the bettor from the ratio of bets that I would observe in the data without long shot bias. In Figure However, the above analysis implies that the ratio of those bets consistent with the behavior of a risk-neutral bettor is denitely higher than 1. Thus, I pick the limit solution θ → ∞ as the correct one and interpret the risk preferences of the marginal bettor who bets constant amounts on both outcomes as extremely risk averse.
In line with the previous argument, the risk preferences continuously shift from extremely risk averse to extremely risk loving. Based on the bet size ratio we can distinguish two cases: if the bet size ratio is lower than that chosen by the risk-neutral bettor, then the marginal bettor is risk averse ( In the second step, the analysis is generalized for the presence of long shot bias.
% This behavior may also be interpreted as a decision to bet a certain amount of money but an unwillingness to bet/lose any more money than that. Such behavior will be more consistent with immense risk-averse preferences than with risk neutral preferences. θ of the CARA utility function on the horizontal axis, given the bet size on the favorite and on the underdog. Long shot bias is present, i.e., odds on the favorite are 1.05 (with the probability of the favorite winning 90%), and odds on the underdog are 7 (probability of winning 10%), leading to an expected return of -0.06% on the favorite and -0.3% on the underdog. risk-loving (line 6) preferences. Moving away from strongly risk-averse preferences, the bet size ratio increases until it reaches its maximum (line 2), marked as ratio max in the gure for θ = θ and betting on the underdog under long shot bias with the bet size on the favorite on the horizontal axis, given the risk aversity parameter θ of the CARA utility function. The dierence is illustrated in an example, where the probability of the favorite winning is 90% and the probability of the underdog winning is 10%. Lines are numbered from most risk averse (1) to least risk averse/most risk loving (6).
It should be stressed that the solution for constant bet size lies within the range of inconsistent solutions with θ < 0 (Figure 3 , thick dark line). This has led authors who held to the constant bet assumption to the erroneous conclusion that bettors have to exhibit risk-loving preferences under EUT.
Methodology
The microstructure of Betfair as a typical betting exchange diers from the classic betting markets, and in certain respects it is more like nancial markets.
Every market on the exchange (for example the event on the winner of a horse race) consists of several outcomes with ex-ante objective probabilities of happening p 1 , . . . , p N . For every outcome of the event bettors have two options: To place a bet that the outcome will happen -the back bet in Betfair terminology; or to place a bet that the outcome will not happen -the lay bet. The Betfair betting exchange is designed as an order-driven market where bettors can place either limit orders or market orders. Market order means that the bettor just chooses a side (buy or sell on classic markets, back or lay on Betfair), a particular outcome, and a bet size. The bet is then matched at the best possible price available on the market.
Limit order means that the bettor is not satised with any market odds available at the moment and chooses not only the side, outcome, and volume, but also the odds at which he is willing to bet. The bet then waits on the market until it is matched by some other bettor. Therefore, when placing a limit order, the bettor has to decide whether to place a back or lay bet and has to stipulate the odds and bet size. On the other hand, when placing a market order, the bettor hits the odds already available on the market and chooses just the bet size and side of the market.
Assume that the bettor decides to place a back bet (the outcome will happen) on outcome 1 of volume one dollar at odds O 1 . With probability p 1 , outcome 1 occurs and the bet yields prot ' I consider them to be risk neutral, as they basically try to balance their liabilities and earn a prot from the spread. The third type of bettor, traders, are similar to bookmakers. Their main concern, however, is not to make money from the spread but to identify arbitrage opportunities. Therefore, ' In analyzing the in-trade soccer markets, Gil and Levitt (2007) point out that the endogenously emerged market makers were on one side of the trade for 65 percent when the markets were inplay, i.e. betting during the running event.
Due to the dierences in market microstructure and in the behavior of bettors on dierent sports markets I analyze the tennis, soccer and horse race events separately. My empirical methodology follows the seminal paper of Jullien and Salanie (2000) . For each event the common bettors face the following successive decisions:
1. The bettor decides whether or not to bet; 2. Conditional on the characteristics of the event, outcomes, and subjective probabilities of winning, the bettor decides how much he would be willing to bet on every outcome; 3. After observing the odds the bettor chooses which outcome in the event he will bet on.
The decisions in the rst and second steps depend on both the event/outcome parameters and the personal characteristics of each bettor. All bettors have their own motives for betting and as no information about their personal characteristics is known, I do not model this decision. Further, I assume that the decisions of common bettors can be represented by the behavior of a representative agentmarginal bettor -with initial wealth M . The marginal bettor is able to anticipate from the equilibrium odds the true probability of winning of particular outcomes in the event. Furthermore, under EUT, for every two outcomes i, j on the market with given odds O i and O j , probabilities p i and p j , and average bet sizes B i and B j , the marginal bettor with given utility function and risk preference parameter θ is indierent between betting on these two outcomes, such that
As the probabilities sum up to one, I obtain the analytical solution for probabilities in the form of bettors only on horse race markets. However, horse race events usually consist of a large number of outcomes (horses) with a low probability of winning and only a few outcomes with a high probability of winning. This could lead to a situation in which I would estimate the risk preferences of bettors just on those bets with a low probability of winning. As pointed out by Forrest and McHale (2007) , however, the tennis betting markets possess the nice feature of having a nearly complete distribution of events with outcomes over the whole probability range. Using data from the tennis and soccer markets, then, allows me to analyze the behavior of bettors facing the complete set of probabilities.
For each outcome on every market and for each odds at which at least one bet was placed, the data from Betfair include information on: the number of bets Bets placed after the event has started (Gandhi 2008) ) have employed starting prices -the odds valid at the start of the event. At betting exchange markets there are, however, always two values of odds -back and lay. Moreover, the odds tend to uctuate even before the start of the event; using just the nal value of odds would result in loss of information about the volume matched and the number of bets placed at odds slightly dierent than the nal odds.
I therefore use the weighted average of odds (by volume matched)
at which at least one bet was placed during the last two hours preceding the start of the match for soccer and tennis, and during the last ve minutes preceding the start of the race for horse racing. The aim was to determine a time interval reasonably long enough to encompass small uctuations of odds around equilibrium, yet still short enough to screen out large changes of odds signaling that the market is not in equilibrium.
The dierent lengths of time intervals for soccer, tennis, and horse racing reect the dierent microstructure of the markets in these sports. Due to the lower number of soccer and tennis markets, as well as the lower number of outcomes on these markets and longer time intervals between these events, the odds on soccer and tennis markets do not often exhibit large uctuations before the start of the event.
The liquidity of Betfair markets varies tremendously, being as low as two bets with ¿4 volume matched to as high as 42,421 bets and ¿9,496,375 volume matched.
Due to the lack of liquidity, I further restrict the analysis to those markets at which at least 20 bets have been placed on each outcome of the event. In the case of tennis and soccer matches the number of outcomes is given, yet for horse races the number of outcomes diers for each race. Thus, to ensure that all the outcomes of horse race events are accounted for, I ruled out those events where the sum of imputed probabilities was lower than 0.98 and considered only those events where the total I eectively treat these small uctuations as if the market was already in equilibrium. I considered intervals in the range of 2 minutes -10 hours before the start of the match. I chose the longest interval in which the average uctuation of probability representation of odds (i.e. imputed probability equal to the inverse value of odds) was still lower than 3%. With the available data I am not able to distinguish between the average back bet size and the average lay bet size as I do not have information on the number of back or lay orders. Thus, in further estimation I assume that the computed average bet size corresponds to the average back bet size. In the Appendix I provide a mathematical proof that under plausible assumptions on the behavior of bettors this approach delivers reliable and correctly interpreted estimation results.
As pointed out before, a usual characteristic of betting market data is the socalled favorite-long shot bias. Smith, Paton, and Williams (2006) suggest that favorite-long shot bias should be lower on betting exchanges. My data are consonant with this, as they exhibit smaller long shot bias on horse race markets (see Figure 5) . Still, Figures 6 and 7 in the Appendix show the presence of fairly strong long shot bias on the tennis and soccer match winner markets.
! Races with more than 13 horses account for less than 8% of the total number of races 
Results
In the rst part, I focused on the importance of accounting for bet size in the analysis of risk preferences of bettors. As discussed above, when we use just price data, the estimates are driven solely by the long shot bias. In Table 1 the estimates of risk aversion for bettors, assuming constant bet size, are presented. The results indicate that the marginal bettor has risk-loving preferences, a nding similar to that of Jullien and Salanie (2000) .
Further, the estimated coecient θB consists of both the parameter of risk aversion θ and the average bet size B, which is ¿20 for horse racing, ¿45 for soccer, and ¿107 for tennis. This implies that the estimates of the risk aversion parameter θ on dierent sports at Betfair are of comparable size, but all of them are signicantly smaller than the estimates of Jullien and Salanie (2000) . One reason may be the higher competition among bookmakers at Betfair markets, but also that as part of the data cleaning procedure I discarded all events with fewer than 20 bets on any of the outcomes and therefore screened out low liquidity markets, i.e. ones facing lower competition among bookmakers.
As explained in Section 2, bet size is key to the analysis of bettors' behavior, as bettors do not usually bet the same amount on dierent odds. Indeed, accounting for bet size dramatically changes the results for all sport types, as presented in Table 2 . These dierences between the markets on dierent sports raise questions about the appropriateness of EUT. Note: number of observations used in the estimation: tennis -17,371 obs., soccer -70, 831 obs., horse races -59,386 obs.
In the second step I test the key dierence between EUT and behavioral theories, namely the assumption that bettors have a linear probability weighting function. If the EUT model of bettors' behavior is correct, we should obtain the same estimates of risk preferences over the whole range of probabilities. Therefore, I draw two types of subsamples from the data on each sport. The rst type is a subsample 21 with favorites, where I condition the selection of events on the presence of a strong favorite. Due to the dierent number of outcomes in the particular sport " , I include the event in the sample only if there are: (a) a tennis player with odds lower than 1.25 in tennis (imputed probability of winning greater than 80%); (b) a team with odds lower than 2.0 in soccer (imputed probability of winning greater than 50%);
and (c) a horse with odds lower than 3.0 in the horse race (imputed probability of winning greater than 33%). I use the odds as a proxy for the objective probabilities of winning. The second type of subsample consists of events without any favorite,
i.e. I include the event in the sample only if both players have odds greater than 1.5
for tennis (imputed probability of winning lower than 66%); if all outcomes have odds greater than 2.3 in soccer (imputed probability of winning lower than 43%);
and if all horses in the race have odds greater than 4.0 in the horse races (imputed probability of winning lower than 25%). Under EUT, the risk preferences of the representative bettor should not dier regardless of whether he is betting on an event with a strong favorite or on an event without large dierences in the winning probabilities of outcomes. Therefore, by comparing the results of the two types of subsamples I can easily test whether a marginal bettor has a linear weighting function of probabilities. " There are two players for tennis, three outcomes for soccer and usually more than six outcomes for horse races leading to signicant dierences in the objective probabilities of winning between the outcomes in these sports. The results for tennis, soccer and horse races are presented in Tables 3-5 . Estimates of the risk aversion parameter for the subsamples with a favorite and without a favorite are signicantly dierent from each other for all three sports. I can therefore reject the null hypothesis of a linear probability weighting function in favor of its non-linear counterparts. Details of the estimation for particular sports are discussed below.
Results for tennis and soccer indicate that the ratio of the bets on outcomes with small dierences in probabilities is higher than the ratio consistent with the behavior of risk-neutral bettors. This might suggest that people overweight small dierences in probabilities. On the other hand, the opposite is true on markets with strong favorites, where the ratio of the amount placed on the more probable outcome to the amount placed on the less probable outcome is lower in comparison with risk-neutral bettors. This might suggest that people either underweight large dierences in probabilities or simply underweight the large probabilities near the reference point 1. Another possible explanation is that bettors have restrictions on their maximum bet size; that is, when the model of risk-neutral bettors implies remarkably high bets for high probable outcomes, the maximum bet size may function as a binding constraint, resulting in a signicantly lower bet ratio of bets on events with strong favorites than on events without any favorites. In both cases, however, I can reject the hypothesis that the marginal bettor at Betfair has a linear 23 weighting function of probabilities.
These results bring further insight to the theories of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) . They assume that people underweight large probabilities and overweight small probabilities, i.e., that zero and certainty serve as reference points from which people oset their perception of probabilities. My results suggest that even particular outcomes serve each other as reference points, which leads to observed overweighting of small dierences in probabilities and underweighting of large dierences in probabilities. The results from horse racing markets also support the observation that bettors do not weight probabilities linearly. However, as suggested by the results in the rst step, in the case of horse races the behavior of bettors seems to follow a dierent pattern than in tennis or soccer. Bettors still slightly overweight the small dierences between probabilities of winning of horses in events without any strong
favorite, yet they overweight the middle-sized dierences in probabilities between underdogs and favorites even more. The rationale for this result lies in the higher number of outcomes on the horse race market and thus the lower absolute values of implied probabilities as well as their dierences. In such a market structure, unlike the tennis and soccer markets, the implied probabilities never cross the threshold where the underweighting behavior of bettors prevails. This research also has broader implications for the general analysis of behavior under uncertainty, particularly for discussions regarding the validity of EUT. My results suggest that, when facing a number of outcomes with dierent winning probabilities, bettors tend to overweight small and underweight large dierences in probabilities, which is in direct contradiction to the linear probability weighting function implied by EUT. These ndings can be presented as a renement on Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , who report the same behavior of agents with respect to absolute values of probabilities. My results also support the theory of reference points in decision making under uncertainty. However, they indicate that people may use more reference points than the generally accepted 0 and 1, as the outcomes might serve as each other's reference points.
the underdog, respectively, as
Total matched volumes on the favorite and the underdog (V OL F , V OL U ) are equal
Solving for B F and B U gives
I am interested in how the average back bet size changes with a dierent proportion of backing bettors on the market. Taking derivatives of B F and B U with respect to m I get In both cases, use of average betting size computed under the assumption that m = 1 biases the results towards risk-neutral preferences. Thus, as long as the real proportion of common bettors on the back side of the market is higher than 0.5, it is reasonable to conclude that my estimate of risk aversion/risk love is a lower/upper bound of a real value.
I have also performed an empirical check of my assumptions through the analysis of bets on 60 markets of the 2006 soccer World Cup for which I have available information on the number of back and lay bets. According to this data, the share of "backers" on the market orders is larger than the share of "layers". The share of back bets ranges from 60% to 90% with an average 73% share of all observed bets for 180 outcomes (3 outcomes per market) of match winner markets, and ranges from 60% to 96% with an average 86% share of all observed bets for 1020 outcomes (17 outcomes per market) of the correct score markets. The average lay bet sizes are always remarkably larger than the average back bet sizes. 
